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And I do thank Him, Who hath blest my hive,  
 And made content my herd, my flock, my bee.  
 But, Father! nobler things I ask from Thee.  
 Fishes have sunshine—worms have everything!  
 Are we but apes?—O give me, God! to know  
 I am death's master; not a scaffolding,  
 But a true temple, where Christ's word could grow.

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*Recognition.*

After the German of Rückhart, by C. E. LACKLAND.

What if on Earth thou goest! the Genius of Earth art,  
 Since Earth doth know thee not, whose beauty charms thine heart.

Upon the Sun dost stand? the Sun's bright essence art;  
 The Sun can know thee not, whose radiance lights thine heart.

If in the Air thou sighest, the Zephyr's life-breath art;  
 The breeze still knows thee not, whose waftings thrill thine heart.

In Water dwellest thou, the Water-Spirit art;  
 The clear stream knows thee not, whose murmurings lull thine heart.

But in the Heart thy home, and thou Love's fire art;  
 Then art thou recognized in Love, who owns thy heart!

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*Pantheism, or God the Universe.*

A correspondent calls attention to our notice of "The Logic of Reason," by Dr. Hickok, in the last number of this journal, and supports the position taken in that work against "Transcendental Logic," including under that term logic as developed in the systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. He characterizes Transcendental Logic as resulting in a system whose highest principle is a "totality of all potentialities, things, and men," a totality which "is but an abstract generalization from experience, though known as the idea of the Universe and taken as self-determining thought-activity, and so a divine Ideal at the source and centre of the Universe in actual evolution is still found and put there in logical deduction from empirical observation." The "God of the Universe," he thinks, according to this view, would be "one with the universe, and our philosophy and theology must determine themselves accordingly. Our speculation is [i.e. would thus be] our thinking out God's thought in its process of universal development, and our theology is [would be] the thought of God as a logical process unfolding the universe as a becoming through perpetual beginnings *à parte ante*, and perpetual ceasings *à parte post*."

"To be satisfactory to reason," he thinks, "we must find a God independent of the universe, intelligibly competent to begin and cease action in the known right and claim of what intrinsically he is, and so an originator of his own ideals, and a creator by expressing his ideals in steadfast, universal forces."

To assert that the Transcendental Logic, as conceived by either one of the thinkers above named, is "but an abstract generalization from experience," is, of course, the most direct repudiation of the claims that they one and all set up for their systems. It was Kant who taught us how to recognize *a priori* ideas by the criteria of *universality* and *necessity*. The *a priori* ideas of the mind are the logical conditions of experience, and hence cannot be derived *from* experience, but are rather the presuppositions of it. Upon this basis—established by Kant—Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, erected their systems and set up their claims to announce therein the logical conditions of experience, the conditioning laws of empirical existence in time and space. Indeed, the clear perception of the implication of universality and necessity in ideas constitutes the great merit of the system of Dr. Hickok. Such sweeping repudiation of the claims of those thinkers to found their systems on an *a priori* basis ought therefore to exhibit with some detail the grounds which justify it. We will not attempt to declare that these systems are not understood, by many readers, in the sense defined by our correspondent. No doubt, every thinker who has reached only the stand-point of the lower stages of reflection will see in all systems that he reads only an empirical connection. He will also find only arbitrary links between the premises and conclusions of Dr. Hickok, because his mind is incapable of making the synthesis or combination required to follow the thoughts of that thinker. The inability to see the necessary connection between the members of a system does not prove that such necessity is not there. Still less does it prove that it is there. But if the author claims to see it, and if his claim is verified by the ability of others to see it, the claim should be refuted by showing that there can be no such necessary connection as that claimed, because another and a different necessity prevails.

Of course, he who verifies the claim of the author, and finds necessity where the author asserts it, cannot be convinced except by demonstration to the contrary. He does not simply hold an *opinion*, but has an insight, or at least thinks that he has, and will be moved from it only by a clearer perception of a necessity annulling the former one.

But we apprehend that this charge against Transcendental Logic, that it reaches only an empirical universality, is based upon a misconception of the claims of the system. This, of course, we must say with due deference. It is simply a matter of individual interpretation. We ourselves confess to have found the systems of thought as established by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, something—we will not say *altogether*, but something *essentially* different from what Dr. Hickok makes of them. And yet we must accredit to his own system a genuine speculative basis.—Inasmuch as our correspondent differs from us in the interpretation which he gives to Hegel and the others—following Dr. Hickok in this—it will, perhaps, be most conducive to mutual understanding to state on our part what we hold, and what we believe those thinkers hold. It frequently happens that two persons hold the same views, but neither can recognize them in the technique of the other.

I. We hold (and believe Hegel to hold) that we possess universal and necessary ideas (and may possess them consciously), and that these uni-

versal and necessary ideas are the logical conditions of our experience, and also logical conditions of the existence of objects in time and space.

II. We hold (and conceive Hegel to have demonstrated) that each thought or idea is a product of the self-determination of mind, and that each thought or idea as determined implies other thoughts or ideas as its definition or limitation: hence that it is implied in each thought, that the mind, being self-determined in this process, can go from any one thought to any or all others simply by tracing out the implied limitation or definition by means of other thoughts. Hence all thought is a system expressed or implied. The complete evolution of the necessary connection implied in ordinary thinking is pure science. If all definition or limitation of thought is through others coördinate with it, then the system of science must necessarily be incapable of being exhausted; the process is an indefinite one, and never can reach a first principle. On the other hand, if a thought or idea can be reached which involves no limitation or determination by means of other thought—in other words, is above and beyond multiplicity—we shall have only an abstract unity cut off from all relation to other thoughts, and hence by its very terms impossible: for by supposition it was to have been reached by tracing out the implied relations or determinations of other thoughts, and thus was necessarily to contain the relations by which it was found.

III. An actual realization of this systematic thinking-out of implied determinations and relations of thought we hold (and Hegel seems to have consciously attempted this realization) will result, if applied first to our ordinary consciousness—our sensuous certitude—in discovering one by one the presuppositions of our civilization: the practical and theoretical wants and needs of each stage of consciousness will unfold *à priori*, but the *where-with* these wants and needs have been historically supplied must be sought for and recognized in history itself. This process of unfolding and developing presuppositions and recognizing the same in the world of time and space is twofold, involving in its analysis universality and necessity, in its recognition only empirical verification. “Such a want or presupposition necessarily exists, thus and so it seems actually to have been supplied.” This is intended as a description of the process of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Mind.” It is a recognition of the necessity of Reason (and by Reason is not meant Intellect alone, but also Will) as the explanation of all phenomena in time and space. The world is finally seen to be not the Absolute, but essentially a Revelation; and now we are ready to investigate the problem, “Of what is the World a Revelation?” Here we come to a different science, if you will. Hegel calls it Logic. The universality and necessity of ideas themselves shall now be investigated, and not the real presuppositions of consciousness. Ideas shall be investigated to find what relations or implications they have among themselves. In this investigation we must begin with the simplest. If we do not, we shall soon come to the simplest, on account of the necessity of analysis to take an inventory of the determinations of each idea. Our system then will sooner or later find its beginning in the simplest idea and pursue a synthetical course, finding that the simple idea implies another for its definition or necessary limitation in thought; and having found this other, adding the same to the former as being neces-

sary to the thought of that former—both being implied in the thinking of either. The synthesis here made is an explicit one, and will be found to have its name as a distinct thought or idea—the ordinary consciousness using it, unconscious either of its constituent determinations or of higher presuppositions which it will be found to have in union with others. Here, therefore, even in Pure Science or Logic there is an empirical activity to be discovered. A synthesis of two thoughts having been discovered as *necessary*, it is requisite to consider empirically what name has been applied in language as a historical affair to a thought or idea corresponding to this definition. Empiricism in this sense is not to be denied; and were its denial possible, we should be obliged to confess that the science of pure thought thus established had, or at least showed, no relation whatever to the actual world of thought, to the ideas and scientific activity of the race. Such a confession would acknowledge the science of pure thought to be no science of thought as it actually exists, but something else of no possible interest to man, any more than the succession of notions in the mind of a lunatic.

IV. The outcome of such science of pure thought we hold to be necessarily one result: (a) The discovery that all ideas of being or immediate existence are in synthesis with others or their *altera*, and the net result of this synthesis is to find that such beings or somewhats are sides of relations, and that Relation is the truth of them and their explanation. They exist only in transition, they are dependent beings, and mutual dependence is their essence. Here we come, therefore, to consider the idea of Relation. (Note, it may be remarked that the natural science of the day has come to this basis.) (b) Relative existence, that which is only in relation—called “reflected existence,” because it is only the appearance or reflection of something else—investigated, proves to be insufficient by itself. All phases of relation—and these include matter and form, force and manifestation, as well as causal and substantial relations—presuppose as their logical condition a self-determining being. We learn by this investigation that all predicates of relation such as cause, or substance, or force, &c. &c., are inadequate when applied to the First Principle; but our investigation at this stage would not have discovered what the First Principle is, except that it is self-determined. (c) Investigation of the presuppositions of self-determined being: It is found that self-determined being involves duality (action upon itself by itself) and unity. It involves self-externality, but also recovery of itself from self-externality—otherwise it would be one of two sides, a positive or a negative, a *this* to some *that*. It must be its *own* other, its *own negative*, its *own* determination. But thus it implies life, cognition, and will. But these three as isolated and sundered are finite and inadequate: they can neither of them be the highest principle. A life which did not know itself would be implicit, and have presuppositions beyond itself both as regards motives and potentialities and as its energizing principle. These must become actual in cognition and will in order that life may become explicit—its own object. Cognition by itself remains a dualism. Only in its highest potency is it self-determining absolutely, and then it is pure will. Will devoid of cognition sinks back to mere Life, and

becomes the external impulse called instinct. Neither is the mere union of these in one person adequate. Man as individual unites these, but in a finite manner. These must be in absolute identity in order to be adequate, and in order that self-determination may be perfect. The Absolute Idea, the Highest Principle, or God, then, must be this union of life, knowledge, and will, each in its perfection and in such identity that each is the other; so that to know is to will and to will is to know, and so that the immediateness of life belongs to it. Now, of course, this is transcendental inasmuch as it cannot possibly be derived from experience; but it is a necessary result of the dialectical examination of ideas in search of one that is adequate for a first principle, or, in other words, to find an idea that does not presuppose something else upon which it depends. Herewith logic as pure science ends, for it has found the object of its search—it has found the adequate Idea, the Eternal Being.

Now, what relation has nature and finite spirit to the Absolute? They certainly cannot be confounded one with the other so long as one has in mind the proved inadequacy of all categories of nature and spirit when set up for first principles. It is manifest that in the Absolute Idea alone we are to find the sufficient reason for nature and man. In God, knowing and willing are one. Hence He is essentially Creator. But not from any external constraint; not from Necessity, or Fate; but solely through freedom and because of freedom. Were He in any way necessitated, were there other being independent and alien to Him, He could not be creative. His self-knowledge is therefore the creation of the world, and of man as an image, object, or reflection of Himself. The World or created Universe is not God, but his Image, his Reflection, his Creation. If we analytically separate any phase or element of the universe and consider it, still less is it God—it is not even his Image. The imperfect concept of freedom as the deliberative state wherein one can do or not do anything, is to blame for this difficulty in thinking the Absolute freedom of God. Instead of adding anything to the perfection of God, to conceive him as capable of creating, or refusing to create, we annul his essential attributes. For, why should the person hesitate when he sees absolutely the one best way, and nothing hinders him from doing it? Will and cognition are separate in man because both are imperfect in him.

Again, the idea that God is a Becoming never could be a clear thought. For that which renders possible a becoming is the separation of the ideal and real. There must be something potential and not real in God if he is a Becoming. But time alone separates the potential from its realization. Now in the past there has been indefinite time, and more than sufficient for the realization of all that is potential. Hence the Absolute must have become all that it could, and that, too, long ago—even from eternity. But the world—creation—as His image or reflection, must exhibit progress and becoming. For out of Chaos He creates the semblance of eternal reason, and this He does eternally in order that He may behold a reflection of Himself in the place of Chaos. As a whole, it does not become; for all stages of its progress were realized from eternity. But any given phase or stage of existence exhibits a progress or struggle toward the more perfect realization

of God's reflection. Thus the inorganic gives place to the organic, plant to animal, animal to man, man the savage to man the human. The final link of this progressive scale of the reflection of God, is man as spirit; for man possesses the capacity of infinite progress through self-activity. He can make not only the external and temporal a sensuous reflection of God, but he can reflect God in his holy will and in his intellectual vision of truth. He can by self-activity come to union with God. This is a self-activity which involves abnegation of self—a yielding up of naturalness, and an assumption of the forms of truth and of the divine will in place of selfishness and finite knowing; hence it is called a process of divine grace, although it is the very acme of self-activity in the individual—his highest freedom, in fact.

Again, this highest reflection of God as it appears in the human spirit cannot by any possibility be confined to one epoch of time and to one globe in the universe. It is necessarily the goal of all creation, and must have been realized from all eternity, so that the stream of souls coming into time and attaining to immortal existence is perpetual and always has been. Herein is the realization in the world of the reflection of the mystery of the Trinity: that God, though one and absolute and the only, yet is personal and spiritual, and demands from eternity recognition of Himself in others; and hence exists as Three Persons, who are yet One God. Thus God's creative activity has the effect to continually produce independent immortal beings, who become more independent and self-active and free the more they realize Him in their lives and thus become one with Him.

This we believe to be Hegel's view of the relation of Creator and Creation, although very imperfectly and hastily stated. He makes God transcendent over Nature, and free and non-identical with aught in Nature except what comes by its own conscious activity (as man does) into concrete identity with Him. And yet Nature reflects, in various degrees, Him. Its lower phases reflect His mechanical power, force, &c. &c.; His self-determination is reflected in various degrees from the crystal up to the self-moving animal. His Will and Intellect and Heart are reflected in various degrees in human history. But all of these are as nought beside the actuality of Him. Their own inadequateness is the negative principle which destroys them and makes them evanescent. Each link, compared with the one next below, is a manifestation of creative Reason, causing the higher to rise from the lower; but compared with its ideal it is inadequate, and gives way to another. Man only because he possesses conscious will preserves his identity in this progress.

Man is not a "logical machine," nor a machine at all. A free machine is a self-contradictory concept. Man's highest ideal is to realize a cognition adequate to his will and life, and to realize the latter in the former. This ideal, when realized, will be free in the highest sense. In fact, the thought of absolute freedom involves this identity of will and cognition, and is not possible on any other terms.

A Life which is so full and perfect that it includes all possibilities is a necessary one (in the sense Kant speaks of Necessity as the union of reality and possibility), for there is nothing else possible to it. In this sense, God's

ife and cognition and will and freedom, and other attributes, are necessary. They realize the entire sphere of possibility. If water could be ice and liquid and vapor all at once, it would become less a contingent being. Ordinarily, two of its states are potential.

As in the above we have not attempted to give any account of the *à priori* dialectical process which we have asserted to exist in pure science, we may be permitted to refer to two articles upon this point already published in this Journal: "On Hegel's Philosophic Method" (January, 1874) and "Trendelenburg and Hegel" (January, 1875).  
EDITOR.

## BOOK NOTICES.

*Die Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik.* Edited and published by J. H. von Fichte, Hermann Ulrici, and J. U. Wirth.

The last volume of this journal noticed by us was the sixtieth; since then we have received five more volumes, bringing this interesting periodical up to 1875. The contents of the five volumes are as follows:

Vol. 61—"Kant's Doctrine of Religion," by Dr. Wm. Bender; "Kant's Transcendental Idealism and von Hartmann's Thing-in-Itself," by Dr. Grapengieser; "Investigations concerning the Association of Ideas and their Influence on Cognition," by Max Schiesl; "The Sources for Plato's Life," by Dr. Steinhart; and "Dynamism Atomism," by H. Ulrici. The most important reviews in this volume are: Dr. Arthur Richter on "Schelling's Life"; Professor Harms's lecture on "Hegel," also reviewed by Richter; and Ulrici's criticism of Luthe's "Contributions to Logic."

Vol. 62—Continuation of Dr. Schiesl's and Dr. Grapengieser's articles; "The Problem of Knowledge at the Time of Socrates and of the Sophists," by Dr. Siebeck; and "The Ontological Question in relation to J. G. Fichte," by G. Mehring. Most interesting among the reviews are: Ulrici on Strauss's "Old and New Faith"; H. Bonitz "In Memory of Trendelenburg," reviewed by Dr. Richter; and a criticism of Zoellner's "On the Nature of Comets," also by Ulrici.

Vol. 63—Continuation of Dr. Grapengieser's and G. Mehring's articles; "Contribution to the History of Æsthetics," by M. Schasler, reviewed by Dr. Lasson. And of book criticisms: Ulrici on DuBois-Reymond's lecture upon "The Limits of Natural Science"; Ulrici on Noah Porter's "The Human Intellect," and Hodgson's "Time and Space" and "The Theory of Practice"; and Dr. Richter on Zeller's "History of German Philosophy since Leibnitz," Dr. Jodl's Life and Philosophy of David Hume, and John Volkelt's "Pantheism and Individualism in the System of Spinoza."

Vol. 64—"The Origin of Conceptions," by Max Schiesl; Count Mamiani's "Theory of Perception," by Seb. Turbiglio, translated by J. Schumann; and "The Platonic Dialectic," by Dr. J. Wolff. Professor Reichlin-Meldegge reviews G. Tiberghien's "*Introduction à la Philosophie et préparation à la Métaphysique*"; J. H. Fichte, M. Carrière's "Art in Relation to the Growth of Culture and the Ideals of Mankind"; and Ulrici, three different works on Hartmann's "Philosophy of the Unconscious."